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SPEECH REGULATION BY ALGORITHM
Enrique Armijo*

ABSTRACT
The rapid convergence of speech and technology on social media platforms
means it is likely the case that, either now or soon, more expressive activity will be
regulated by Artificial Intelligence (AI) than by any legislature, regulator, or other
government entity. Mark Zuckerberg has repeatedly told Congress and other audiences
that AI is the key to resolving Facebooks content moderation challenges, envisioning a moderation regime where algorithms detect and take down speech infringing
Facebooks Community Standards ex ante, that is, prior to its public posting and
before it reaches other users. According to Zuckerberg, this would eventually replace
its initial content moderation practices, which relied more on human moderators and
user complaints than on automated detection and removala system that can be
slow, inconsistently applied, and often subjects front-line moderators to harrowing
emotional harms by exposing them to the worst of the Internet.
This Article argues that private parties speech-regulation-by-algorithm is itself
protected speech. Government efforts to regulate the content moderation of platforms
will thus necessarily be barred by the First Amendment, even if that moderation is
automated via AI. Nor would users whose speech has been regulated by AI have any
better speech-related claims against AI-informed platform moderation decisions than
they have had against nonautomated moderation, for the same reason. However, automated front-end filtering of user speech via AI is in serious tension with several core
tenets of First Amendment doctrine. Ex ante AI-based content moderation operates
in much the same way as a prior restraint; like government prepublication censorship,
it gives users no notice of takedowns prior to publication, nor reasons for the takedown
decision (at least reasons that a lay user would be capable of understanding). Additionally, it is already clear based on its current use, and the necessities of machine learning
processes, that content-based speech regulation via AI is necessarily overinclusive,
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University School of Law; Affiliated Fellow, Yale Law School Information Society Project;
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which is normally sufficient to find a law or regulation unconstitutional under the First
Amendmenta problem that will only grow worse as AI moderates more speech.
Given these concerns, this Article advocates for many of the same robust notice
and procedural rights for platform users whose speech is regulated via AI, as the
First Amendment compels of governments seeking to regulate private speakers.
INTRODUCTION
[O]ver the long term, building AI tools is going to be the scalable way
to identify and root out most of th[e] harmful content [on Facebook].
Mark Zuckerberg1
The long term is here. During his congressional testimony on the Cambridge
Analytica scandal in 2018 and several times since, Facebooks Mark Zuckerberg has
pointed to AI as the primary identification and enforcement tool for Facebooks
Community Standards.2 Implicit in Zuckerbergs technological faith in AI is an acknowledgment that primarily human review of user content will never be up to the
task. There is simply too much content for human review to scale.
It is important to focus on not just Zuckerbergs invocation of AIafter all, he is
a computer engineerbut also the role he envisions for it, in particular the point at
which the platform would use it to moderate content. More precisely, Zuckerberg
offers AI as the means by which offending content would never reach other Facebook
users at allin other words, to operate ex ante rather than ex post.3 Under a primarily human-driven moderation regime, AI permits human content moderators to find
and take down offending content more quickly than the traditional adjudication
decision system. Rather, what Zuckerberg envisions is a system whereby AI would
both identify the content and remove it from the platform before other users could
see or interact with it at all.
The AI content moderation world that Zuckerberg has described is not as far off
as one might think. According to Facebooks own statistics, machine learning is
1

Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg Hearing on Data Privacy and Protection, C-SPAN
(Apr. 10, 2018) [hereinafter Zuckerberg Hearing], https://www.c-span.org/video/?443543-1
/facebook-ceo-mark-zuckerberg-testifies-data-protection&start=6378 [https://perma.cc
/W9KB-DU2T].
2
Mike Schroepfer, Update on our Progress on AI and Hate Speech Detection, FACEBOOK
(Feb. 11, 2021), https://about.fb.com/news/2021/02/update-on-our-progress-on-ai-and-hate
-speech-detection/ (97% of hate speech taken down from Facebook was spotted by our automated systems before any human flagged it, up from 94% in the previous quarter and 80.5%
in late 2019.).
3
See Zuckerberg Hearing, supra note 1 (explaining that Facebook is developing A.I.
tools that can identify certain classes of bad activity proactively and flag it for our team).
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playing an exponentially larger role in rooting out offensive user content.4 Social
media platform Parler was initially removed from the Apple Store and other hosting
services for its failure to effectively moderate content; it has had to adopt AI-based
content moderation tools as a condition of its availability to users. 5 In sum, as more
speech goes online, more speech will be moderated by AI, and the transitional point
between a predominantly ex ante versus ex post system, at least for the largest platforms, has already occurred.
Automated speech regulation has obvious consequences for free expression. To
be sure, a platforms decisions as to what user speech to host or not is itself expressive,
and thus speech protected by the First Amendment. But the move from primarily
human-based to AI-based enforcement of content rules carries significant consequences for user speech. To begin with, AI is a blunt tool at best for identifying
many forms of content that most platform terms of service might find infringing.
The move from ex post to ex ante review of user content exacerbates that imprecision and its consequences. And the fact still remains that though human content
moderation is necessarily imperfect, it still does a much better job at explaining its
reasoning than machine learning does. Because of how machine processes learn,
every incorrect decision that AI makes with respect to content moderation comes at
the expense of user speech.
This Article proceeds as follows. To unpack the free speech-related issues applicable to algorithmic content moderation, Part I distinguishes between two types
of AI used social media management: Type I, which involves social media platforms
ordering and ranking of user content in order to optimize or decrease other users
engagement with content on their platforms, and Type II, which involves the detection and removal of offensive user content from the platform. Offensive here
means not just illegal speech, but also speech violative of the platforms terms of
service. Type II AI content moderation is this Articles focus. Part II addresses several
issues concerning Type II algorithmic content regulation which implicate user expression on platforms, focusing on the bluntness of AI as a moderation tool and the
lack of notice-based issues inherent to Type II moderationissues that raise both
speech and due process concerns that are exacerbated by the machine learning
process. Part III proposes some remedies to those Type IIrelated problems, highlighting the role of Facebooks Oversight Board in proposing policies to Facebook
that would, in the Boards view, give users more notice and process around Type II
takedown decisions. Part III also looks to Type II content moderation as a decisionmaking model and proposes several interventions to ameliorate user concerns about
over-moderation while still preserving for platforms the ability to act against disinformation and harmful content in an expedient fashion.
4

See infra text accompanying notes 4652.
Kevin Randall, Social App Parler Is Cracking Down on Hate Speechbut Only on
iPhones, WASH. POST (May 17, 2021, 4:41 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technol
ogy/2021/05/17/parler-apple-app-store/ [https://perma.cc/5SRJ-6Z2H].
5
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I. TYPE I VS. TYPE II ALGORITHMIC CONTENT MODERATION
Before addressing the issues that speech regulation by AI raises, it is first necessary
to identify what kind of speech regulation by AI one means, because different AI
moderation systems present different challenges. In a recent article,6 Tim Wu distinguished between what he called platforms positive (or affirmative; he uses both
terms interchangeably) and negative algorithmic speech control. Positive speech
control entails choosing what is brought to the attention of the user [and] is found
in the operation of search results, newsfeeds, advertisements, and other forms of
promotion and is typically algorithmic.7 By contrast, negative speech control consists
of removing and taking down disfavored, illegal, or banned content, and punishing
or removing users.8 Wu also notes that positive speech controlsincluding Google
search results, YouTube video auto-play selections and recommendations, and
Facebook news feed and Twitter timeline orderinghave been predominantly algorithmic since their inception. Conversely, negative speech controls were originally
complaint-driven and administered by humans, until the scale of content review
compelled platforms to automate more and more moderation, initially at the screening level and now at the point of takedown as well.9
Wus distinction is useful, but his terminology potentially confuses. Positive
content moderation, as he notes, involves not only bringing certain content to users
attention to attempt to drive engagement, but also downgrading, de-promoting, and
disadvantaging of content that the algorithmic system deems low quality but not violative of use rules.10 In other words, when sorting user feeds and other user-platform
interactions, positive content moderation treats user content both positively and
negatively.11 And negative content moderation involves not only the removal of
6

Tim Wu, Will Artificial Intelligence Eat the Law? The Rise of Hybrid Social-Ordering
Systems, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2014 (2019).
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 2015.
10
See, e.g., Nick Clegg, You and the Algorithm: It Takes Two to Tango, MEDIUM (Mar. 31,
2021), https://nickclegg.medium.com/you-and-the-algorithm-it-takes-two-to-tango-7722b19
aa1c2 [https://perma.cc/KD3V-XDXD] (discussing how Facebook reduces [] distribution
of problematic but non-violating content); Josh Constine, Facebook Will Change Algorithm
to Demote Borderline Content That Almost Violates Policies, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 15, 2018,
3:21 PM EST), https://techcrunch.com/2018/11/15/facebook-borderline-content/ [https://perma
.cc/4CQD-DPUK].
11
See Sang Ah Kim, Social Media Algorithms: Why You See What You See, 2 GEO. L.
TECH. REV. 147 (2017), for an excellent explanation of engagement-based algorithmic content
moderation and its motivations. One fundamental issue for Type I content moderation is the fact
that, at least as to Facebook, the most engagement-maximizing content is also the content
most likely to violate Facebooks Community Standards. In other words, Type I algorithms
that maximize engagement reward inflammatory content. See Karen Hao, How Facebook
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offending content but also leaving it up after an algorithmic or human moderator
determines that it does not violate a platforms terms of service. 12 Accordingly, this
Article preserves the distinction but uses Type I to describe algorithmic ordering
and ranking and Type II to describe the detection, assessment, and potential removal of potentially offending content.
A primary reason for disaggregating the types of algorithmic speech regulation
is because the rationale and capacity for government intervention is likely to change
depending on whether the practice sought to be regulated is either Type I or Type II.
To start, the goals of each type of content moderation are distinct; as noted, Type I
regulates user content to optimize user engagement, while Type II regulates user content to enforce rules concerning what is permissible on the platform. This distinction
may be of constitutional significance. Free speech scholars, including Helen Norton
in her contribution to this Symposium, have argued that Type I content moderation is
less speech-like in a conventional First Amendment sense, either because algorithmic speech ordering is not itself speech13 or because, as Norton argues, its primary
intent is to manipulate other users,14 and thus it should be more amenable to regulation to prevent or minimize harms associated with its use. Indeed, in light of the role
that social media may have played in disseminating information related to the
Capitol insurrection on January 6, 2021, legislators at the federal level have begun
taking steps to try and regulate platforms uses of algorithmic amplification.15
There are good reasons, however, to focus on Type II content moderation as well.
First of all, though the scope of Type II regulation has increased exponentially, it
has a pedigree similar to that of Type I in domains outside of moderation of content
that the platform deems offensive. Platforms have long used automated processes,
Got Addicted to Spreading Misinformation, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 11, 2021), https://www
.technologyreview.com/2021/03/11/1020600/facebook-responsible-ai-misinformation/
[https://perma.cc/F4U2-NPP2].
12
Wu, supra note 6.
13
See Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2013) [hereinafter Wu,
Machine Speech] (Too much protection would threaten to constitutionalize many areas of
commerce and private concern without promoting the values of the First Amendment.). But
see Stuart Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445 (2013).
14
See Helen Norton, Manipulation and the First Amendment, 30 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 221 (2021).
15
See, e.g., Taylor Hatmaker, At Social Media Hearing, Lawmakers Circle AlgorithmFocused Section 230 Reform, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 27, 2021, 5:14 PM), https://techcrunch.com
/2021/04/27/section-230-bills-algorithms-congress-hearing/?guccounter=1&guce_referrer
=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAEHe1peg3qAj5lTY
VmEjSdd71g1UCzL852QIHd8IXK6b67oOIugsJ9sB79zsn2k0fYGUgyz0HXUsWibSnaY
sxB5RHVo3U17v8pdcmW4nvkVKIJwueTsFfhDI9Yc502wEVo1UyaqFiKOOHOj9EG8fz
L8UYrBm5szS5qbf5PKXjI3b [https://perma.cc/V7KF-6C4Y]; Protecting Americans from
Dangerous Algorithms Act, H.R. 2154, 117th Cong. (2021); Algorithmic Justice and Online
Platform Transparency Act, S. 1896, 117th Cong. (2021).
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such as Content ID16 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act17 to enforce their IPrelated terms of service. Further, as noted in the introduction above, a marked
increase in the use of Type II regulation by platforms is inevitable given the scale
problem: there is no way to moderate user content on Facebook or YouTube without
some form of automated review. Additionally, pressures from governments in the
United States and abroad are pushing platforms to move Type II regulation further
back in the user experienceto the point where regulators increasingly expect
platforms to, as Hannah Bloch-Wehba has shown, prevent the dissemination of
unlawful online content before it is ever seen or distributed.18 And most importantly for present purposes, moderation of offensive user content simply looks more
like speech than algorithmic engagement optimization, due to the fact that, as discussed in more detail at Section II.A below, the decisions that platforms make with
respect to what content belongs on their platforms is inherently expressive.19
Accordingly, as Type II content moderation moves from a predominantly humancentered form of response to user complaints and assessment of the appropriateness
of that content to an algorithmic screening of user content ex ante, Type II problems
look more like conventional speech problems as well. I now turn to discuss these
problems in greater detail.

16

Wu, supra note 6, at 2007 (citing How Content ID Works, YOUTUBE HELP, https://sup
port.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en [https://perma.cc/WV5R-CBUR]).
17
JENNIFER M. URBAN ET. AL, NOTICE & TAKEDOWN IN EVERYDAY PRACTICE 8 (2016)
(describing the move in DMCAs notice-and-takedown regime from predominately human
to reliance on computer algorithms to both detect potential infringements and generate
notices.).
18
Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Automation in Moderation, 53 CORNELL INTL L.J. 41, 4243
(2020); see also Carey Shenkman et al., Do You See What I See?: Capabilities and Limits
of Automated Multimedia Content Analysis, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (May 2021),
https://cdt.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/2021-05-18-Do-You-See-What-I-See-Capa
bilities-Limits-of-Automated-Multimedia-Content-Analysis-Full-Report-2033-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8EEL-DCFW].
By use of the term further back, I have in mind a three-step user experience on a platform that involves: (1) the submission of content by one user, (2) the posting of that content
by the platform to which the user submitted the content, then (3) the viewing of that content
by a second user. Moving content moderation further back would move both the assessment of whether the content violated the platforms user rules, and its takedown if it did, from
after Step 3 to between Steps 1 and 2. As discussed in Part II, infra, this move raises due
process concerns.
19
See Enrique Armijo, Reasonableness as Censorship: Section 230 Reform, Content
Moderation, and the First Amendment, 73 FLA. L. REV. 1199, 1277 (2021) [hereinafter Armijo,
Reasonableness as Censorship]. For an argument to the contrary, namely that the ranking
and ordering of content may be more constitutionally protected than the hosting of user
speech, see Eugene Volokh, Treating Social Media as Common Carriers?, 1 J. FREE SPEECH
L. 377 (2020).
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II. TYPE II PROBLEMS
A. Content Moderation as Expressive (Human or Algorithmic)
I begin with a proposition that should not be closely contested: Type II content
moderation decisions by platforms and websites, whether undertaken by humans or
algorithms, are protected from government regulation by the First Amendment.20
The whether undertaken by humans or algorithms part of that proposition requires
some further argument in support.
Content moderation policies themselvesthe speech rules by which users are
bound as conditions for their use of the platform in questionare expressive. Platforms are motivated to moderate user speech to ensure that the platforms and the
speech they host are consistent, or at least not in conflict, with their values and
goals.21 Accordingly, Facebooks Community Standards, which the platform crafts
to ensure that everyones voice is valued and to be inclusive of different views
and beliefs, define Objectionable Content to include, for example, Hate Speech,
and proceed to define that term as a direct attack against people . . . on the basis of
what [it] calls protected characteristics: race, ethnicity, national origin, disability,
religious affiliation, caste, sexual orientation, sex, gender identity and serious disease.22
Parlers Community Guidelines states the platforms goal is to provide all community members with a welcoming, nonpartisan Public Square, and that its mission
is to create a social platform in the spirit of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution, and so it claims to moderate content in a viewpoint-neutral
way.23 Twitters Rules state their purpose is to serve the public conversation, that
[v]iolence, harassment and other similar types of behavior discourage people from
expressing themselves, and ultimately diminish the value of global public conversation, and that the Rules are to ensure all people can participate in the public
20

It may be more accurate to say they are covered rather than protected, i.e., that the
First Amendment applies, but that the government could potentially overcome a First
Amendmentdependent defense with a justification and sufficiently tailored means to achieve
that end that would survive judicial review. See generally Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries
of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 1765 (2004).
21
Bloch-Wehba, supra note 18, at 53 (explaining that undesirable activity has driven
online communities to develop rules and restrictions to avoid damage to the online community
and depletion of resources).
22
Community Standards: Introduction, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/commu
nitystandards/introduction [https://perma.cc/2Q8Z-GX83] (last visited Dec. 13, 2021); Com
munity Standards: Objectionable Content, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/commu
nitystandards/objectionable_content [https://perma.cc/6JEB-32T5].
23
Community Guidelines, PARLER (Feb. 14, 2021), https://legal.parler.com/documents
/guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8PC-ZD9P].
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conversation freely and safely.24 The Rules then set out categories of content that
are not permitted due to their conflict with the values of safety, privacy, and
authenticity.25 The identification of these values, and the process of defining them,
are quintessentially expressive; platforms are deciding on and defining the user expression they want to be associated with or not. This is true of any use rule that is
content-based. Content-based use rules obviously express a preference for a certain
kind of content.
If the values underlying a platforms use rules are expressive, then it follows
that the act of banning users or removing content that fails to conform with those
values and goals is expressive as wellthe enforcement act expresses content
preferences by disassociating the platform from user speech that expresses a conflicting view. In the non-social media context, this process is uncontroversially understood to be a form of editing. As courts have consistently found in rejecting claims
brought against platforms by banned users, content moderation is an exercise of
editorial discretion.26
Given that, a case that algorithmic content moderation is less constitutionally
protected must rest on the argument that the process by which content moderation
occurs can reduce its protection. In other words, the automation of moderation
reducing the role of a person or people in the act of assessing and removing
contentchanges the First Amendment analysis.27 To be sure, the argument has
some appeal; extending constitutional protection via the Speech Clause to machine
processes seems to stray from the core human-based (or humanity-based28) expressive acts and decisions with which First Amendment doctrine has long been most
concerned. But the argument relies on a misapprehension as to how algorithmic
content moderation actually operates.
To understand why the fact of automation does not change the First Amendment
analysis with respect to content moderation, it helps to understand AI, or at least the
24

The Twitter Rules, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-rules
[https://perma.cc/2JGC-ZZ86] (last visited Dec. 13, 2021).
25
Id.
26
See, e.g., Adi Robertson, Social Media Bias Lawsuits Keep Failing in Court, THE VERGE
(May 27, 2020, 5:43 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/5/27/21272066/social-media-bias
-laura-loomer-larry-klayman-twitter-google-facebook-loss [https://perma.cc/8TUG-CF6G].
27
See Tim Wu, Free Speech for Computers?, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2012), https://www
.nytimes.com/2012/06/20/opinion/free-speech-for-computers.html [https://perma.cc/U6E8
-YHXV] (To give computers the rights intended for humans is to elevate our machines above
ourselves.); Wu, Machine Speech, supra note 13, at 151718, 152123 (arguing that under
the First Amendment functionality doctrine, AI communication tools perform tasks unrelated
to the communication of ideas and are therefore exempt from free speech protection); Niva
Elkin-Koren & Maayan Perel, Separation of Functions for AI: Restraining Speech Regulation
by Online Platforms, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 857, 86263 (2020).
28
See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989); STEVEN
J. HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH AND HUMAN DIGNITY (2008).
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type of AI used in Type II content moderation, as an application of agency theory.
As is the case in legal theory, the study of AI by computational theorists has also
used the language of agency, and the term is used similarly in both contexts.
For AI theorists, an agent-based AI system is one that is complete in the
sense that it [is] a self-contained, autonomous entity, situated in some environment
and carrying out some specific task on behalf of a user.29 Among other influential
AI thinkers, MIT roboticist Rodney Brooks was instrumental in arguing against the
knowledge-based approach that conceptualized AI systems as disembodied . . .
logical reasoners that predominated before the 1980s.30 Instead, Brooks argued
instead in favor of a behavioral approach that ties machine learning to its instructions and environment.31 Decades before the implementing hardware associated with
AI reached the technical capacity to do so on a large scale, robotics theorists were
describing agent-based algorithmic processes that would eventually automate email
management, meeting scheduling, filtering news, and music recommendation for
millions of human users.32
To be clear, these processes were not following programmer instructions in a
rote fashion; as the decision-making context changed, the AI agent would start to
take the initiative and process [the instructed function] according to its prediction
and based on what it had learned.33 But the processes predictions were as to how to
reach the result the user had chosen based on the users preferences, not the actual
result itself.34 When faced with a decision, an automated agent chooses an action
whose outcome maximizes utility on [its users] behalf; which is the same as saying
that it chooses an action in order to bring about [the users] most preferred outcome.35
These processes involve applying inferences to new facts, but machine learning
inferences are what Kate Crawford calls inductive inference[s], or a hypothesis
based on available data, rather than deductive inference[s], the type which follow[] logically from a premise that are the product of human knowledge and
29

MICHAEL WOOLDRIDGE, A BRIEF HISTORY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: WHAT IT IS,
WHERE WE ARE, AND WHERE WE ARE GOING 93 (2021) (emphasis added). I realize that this
Part uses the term user to alternate between (1) a user of a machine learning system to
execute a task that the user needs done, and (2) a user of a social media platform. I apologize for the confusion and hope the context makes clear which user I mean in a sentence
of mine or a quotation or paraphrase from another source.
30
Id.
31
Id. (discussing Brooks work and influence).
32
Id. at 9697 (citing Pattie Maes, Agents that Reduce Work and Information Overload,
37 COMMCNS OF THE ACM, 3040 (1994)).
33
Id. at 97.
34
See id. at 99100 (describing optimal decision-making theory in agent-based AI as
based around preferences and the principle that [i]f your agent is to act on your behalf, then
it needs to know what your wishes are. You then want the agent to act in order to bring about
your preferred choices as best it can.).
35
Id. at 100.
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intuition.36 The sum of what the machine learning system knows is only what the
principal has either taught it directly (in the form of a training dataset of examples
compiled by the principal) or taught it to learn (instructions as to how to classify,
based on the training dataset, a new example that was not part of the that dataset).37
The behavioral grounding of AI agency theory does not reject the concept of autonomous knowledge development entirely, but even the systems accumulation of
knowledge and its application of that knowledge to new facts is in service to the
principals expressive goal. Thats what makes the system an agent that executes the
expressive intent of another, and not a principal that executes its own.
In other words, to return to the legal context, [t]he fact that an algorithm is
involved [in effectuating a content-related decision] does not mean that a machine
is doing the talking.38 As is the case in legal agency theory, the agent (the AI system
that moderates content) is effectuating decisions on behalf of the principal (the platform using the AI system), not making its own decisions.39 The expressive decision
of what to moderate is a protected editorial decision that rests with the principal, not
the agent.40 The fact that AI assists in effectuating that decision does not affect the
constitutional analysis. And this is true whether the AI the platform is using for
Type II content moderation is learning the difference between permissible and
barred content through training examples before operating on the platform, or on
actual user posts once the AI is in the act of moderating those posts.41 The machine
learning process also inevitably involves implementing the principals decision
incorrectly by putting a piece of user content in the wrong category, and the process
is then trained to self-correct once it is instructed of its error.42 But this is simply
agency theory in operationafter learning of an implementation mistake, the AI agent
is being reinstructed with respect to the principal/users expressive goals.43 Nothing
36

KATE CRAWFORD, ATLAS OF AI: POWER, POLITICS, AND THE PLANETARY COSTS OF
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 97 (2021).
37
Id.; see also id. at 134.
38
See Benjamin, supra note 13, at 1479.
39
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (AM. L. INST. 1958).
40
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (First Amendment protects platforms ability to decid[e] [which content] to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter);
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commn on Hum. Rel., 413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973) (reaffirming
the First Amendment speech protection afforded to editorial judgment); Miami Herald
Publg Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
41
Training examples in the automated content moderation context would include examples of terms-of-service-infringing content in image form, or repeating patterns of certain
infringing word and phrase usages in the case of text. See, e.g., TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET 98101 (2018) (explaining training examples for AI content moderation
systems and how they lead to false positives).
42
As Kate Crawford notes, error-checking and correcting maintenance in AI systems is
often done by humans, not other machinespredominantly underpaid and exploited humans.
See CRAWFORD, supra note 36, at 6668.
43
See id.
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in the fact that the agent makes implementation mistakes makes the agents actions
more regulatable because those mistakes, just like the instances in which the principals will is executed correctly, are not the product of the agents expressive choice.
Accordingly, automated content moderation does not undertake any expressive
decisions of its own, but rather effectuates the expressive decisions of its user. It
may do so at a much faster and more replicable rate than the user, but the expressive
intent underlying the decision remains the same.44
B. The Rise of Type II Algorithmic Content Moderation and Algorithms as Blunt
Instruments
A fully realized Type II content moderation world such as the one Mark
Zuckerberg described to Congressan algorithmic system that can preemptively
detect, without the need for a triggering complaint, not just existing categories of
problematic content like nudity, child pornography, or material infringing copyright,
but also more subjective categories like hate speech, incitement, and harmful
disinformationdoes not yet fully exist, even on Facebook. There is no doubt,
however, that on the largest platforms the move from mostly human to Type II
moderation has already begun.45 Facebook is touting AIs improved effectiveness
in proactively detecting offending contentproactively here meaning that the AI
has detected the offending content without having to wait for a user report.46 Even
with respect to context-based content like hate speech, Type II is playing an increasingly larger role in content moderation, which is what one would expect as the
technology develops.47
44

And to the extent the decisions the algorithm is instructed to effectuate are implicitly
biased, the outputs will reflect that bias as welland bias is itself expressive. See id. at 135
(Every dataset used to train machine learning systems, whether in the context of supervised
or unsupervised machine learning, whether seen to be technically biased or not, contains a worldview. To create a training set . . . requires inherently political, cultural, and social choices.).
See also Armijo, Reasonableness as Censorship, supra note 19, at 2021; Anupam Chander,
The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023 (2017); Maarten Sap et al., The Risk of
Racial Bias in Hate Speech Detection, 2019 ASSN COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 1668
(establishing strong connections between use of African American English dialect used
by self-identifying African American users and toxicity annotations by automated hate
speech categorizers).
45
This move was exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic, which caused platforms to have
to drastically scal[e] back human moderation and increase[] reliance on AI. Evelyn Douek,
Governing Online Speech: From Posts-as-Trumps to Proportionality & Probability, 121
COLUM. L. REV. 759, 802 (2021).
46
Mike Schroepfer, How AI Is Getting Better at Detecting Hate Speech, FACEBOOK AI
BLOG (Nov. 19, 2020), https://ai.facebook.com/blog/how-ai-is-getting-better-at-detecting-hate
-speech/ [https://perma.cc/7HNP-BUDL] (noting that its AI content moderation systems proactive detection rate rose from 24% of all hate speech removed from the platform in the fourth
quarter of 2017 to 95% in the third quarter of 2020).
47
Douek, supra note 45, at 79394.
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But even a fully realized ex ante Type II content moderation system would remain
a blunt instrument with respect to many kinds of user speech. As noted, machine
learning is trained on the familiar: it identifies problematic content only to the extent
its users have supplied it with examples that are substantially similar.48 And textbased data sets alone are not well-suited for making the contextual considerations
that human judgment undertakes when assessing factors like a speakers intent or
motive.49 Innovation in toxicity online under a Type II system, in other words, has
compounding returns. New forms of toxic content are much more difficult to detect
and remove and are thus more likely to go viral before the platform can intervene. 50
When considering machine learning as applied to speech problems,51 one also
sees how another concept from First Amendment doctrine, the concept of overinclusiveness, pervades the decision-making process. To the extent a Type II system
48

See, e.g., Laura Hanu, James Thewlis & Sasha Haco, How AI Is Learning to Identify
Toxic Content Online, SCI. AM. (Feb. 8, 2021), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article
/can-ai-identify-toxic-online-content/ [https://perma.cc/VZ5S-8QUY] (describing how toxic
speechdetecting algorithms that use text classification models work well on examples that
are similar to the data they have been trained on[, b]ut they are likely to fail if faced with
unfamiliar examples of toxic language.); GILLESPIE, supra note 41; see Arcadiy Kantor,
Measuring Our Progress Combatting Hate Speech, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM BLOG (Nov. 19,
2020) [hereinafter Kantor, Measuring Our Progress], https://about.fb.com/news/2020/11
/measuring-progress-combating-hate-speech/ [https://perma.cc/Z6KU-HD7E] ([d]efining
hate speech isnt simple, as there are many differing opinions on what constitutes hate speech.
Nuance, history, language, religion, and changing cultural norms are all important factors to
consider as we define our policies.).
49
Monika Bickert, European Court Ruling Raises Questions About Policing Speech,
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM BLOG (Oct. 14, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/10/european
-court-ruling-raises-questions-about-policing-speech/ [https://perma.cc/B9DT-9MXJ] (stating
that [w]hile [Facebooks] automated tools have come a long way, they are still a blunt instrument and unable to interpret the context and intent associated with a particular piece of
content, and that [d]etermining a posts message is often complicated, requiring complex
assessments around intent and an understanding of how certain words are being used.);
Shenkman et al., supra note 18, at 15 (An important consideration in utilizing matching-based
systems is their general inability to assess context. The same pieces of content . . . in one
context may have significant expressive and public interest value in a different setting, such
as in art, academic or journalistic work, or human rights commentary.); Natasha Duarte et
al., Mixed Messages? The Limits of Automated Social Media Content Analysis, CTR. FOR
DEMOCRACY & TECH 1, 8 (Nov. 2017) [hereinafter Duarte et al., Mixed Messages?], https://
cdt.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Mixed-Messages-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8LS
-45YH] (proposals calling for or requiring platforms to automate content moderation wrongly
assume that automated technology can accomplish on a large scale the kind of nuanced analysis
that humans can accomplish on a small scale.); see Deepa Seetharaman et al., Facebook
Says AI Will Clean Up the Platform. Its Own Engineers Have Doubts., WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17,
2021, 9:17 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-ai-enforce-rules-engineers-doubtful
-artificial-intelligence-11634338184 [https://perma.cc/6UHH-XCQX].
50
See Kantor, Measuring Our Progress, supra note 48 (Language continues to evolve,
and a word that was not a slur yesterday may become one tomorrow.).
51
See Armijo, Reasonableness as Censorship, supra note 19, at 2021.
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learns from its mistakes, the cost of those mistakes, in the form of false positives,
results, at least initially, in less speech. For example, take an algorithmic system that
has learned how to screen for and take down livestreams of gun violence. That
system would have prevented the Christchurch murders in March 2019 from being
posted, reposted, and viewed by thousands of Facebook and Facebook Live users.
But it would likely also detect and preemptively block streams showing police
shootings or their immediate aftermaths, such as the shootings of Philando Castile
in St. Paul and Sean Reed in Indianapolis.52 In such a scenario, assume the system
initially blocks both posts, but the content moderator overseeing the system wants
users to be able to livestream police brutality, and so a human intervention reorients
the machine learning system to permit the second type of case (assuming, of course,
that such a distinguishing intervention is actually possible). So, every modification
of the machine learning system in favor of more speech requires an initial speech
harm. In other words, the Type II system only makes the both barred mistake once,
learns from it, and then learns to leave the second category of speech up. But the
cost of that learning case is that user speech that the platform values does not reach
other users, at least until the error is recognized as such and corrected.
In addition to those substantive problems, Type II systems present procedural
challenges as well. The traditional role of automation in content moderation has
been to flag potentially offending content on the platform for a human moderators
review, at which point the human decides whether the content stays or is removed.53
But if a true ex ante Type II system deems user speech as contrary to a platforms
terms of service, the consequence of that classification is removal from the platform
before that content is publicly posted.
Indeed, it might invite imprecision to use the term removal in this circumstance at all. In the analogous First Amendment context, we would consider this
conduct by the decision-maker a prior restraint; the speech in question is prevented
from being disseminated because a government decision maker has concluded the
speech offends the relevant standard, and the primary harm is procedural in nature
52

See Fred Ritchin, In the Livestream Era, the Trauma Is Widespread, TIME (July 11,
2016, 12:47 PM), https://time.com/4400930/philando-castile/ [https://perma.cc/ZWX5-KXKE];
Ryan Martin & Tony Cook, Indianapolis Police Fatally Shoot Man After a Chase Possibly
Broadcast on Facebook Live, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (May 6, 2020, 8:08 PM), https://www
.indystar.com/story/news/crime/2020/05/06/police-shooting-reported-on-the-north-side
/5180240002/ [https://perma.cc/5M3G-D6HP]. Additionally, some evidence indicates that
the production of false positives is itself also biasedi.e., that algorithms can have higher false
positive rates for under-represented speakers than for white ones. See Duarte et al., Mixed Messages?, supra note 49, at 19 (citing Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23,
2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sen
tencing [https://perma.cc/GSA5-UMV5]). I have illustrated the overinclusiveness problem with
respect to content moderation using these two examples before. See Armijo, Reasonableness
as Censorship, supra note 19, at 2021.
53
See GILLESPIE, supra note 41, at 97.
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because the speaker is deprived of the opportunity to argue that the decision-makers
interpretation of the standard and classification of the speech under it is wrong. We
do not think of the decision-makers post-classification action in the traditional prior
restraint context as a removal, since the speech has not been disseminated (thats
what prior in prior restraint meansprior to dissemination of the speech in question).
Likewise here, the algorithm has prevented the speech from reaching the platform
at all, not removed it once it has been posted and classified as offending. Removal
is an ex post intervention by a speech regulator, not an ex ante one.
In fact, if one puts aside the state action question and focuses solely on the harm
to speech under each system, this form of digital prior restraint is even worse for the
speaker than the conventional one; in the latter example, at least a speaker in most
cases knows their speech is being restrained. In an ex ante Type II system, by contrast, the restriction happens behind the speakers screen, so absent some operational
constraint rule requiring notice, they may not know their speech is being restricted
at all.54 Additionally, unlike in a conventional prior restraint system, where the party
imposing the classification is (at least nominally) applying some standard for harmful speech promulgated by another party, here the platform has the sole authority to
decide both (1) what constitutes a violation, and (2) the manner by which violations
are penalized and their implementation.55
And all these procedural problems are compounded by the fact that a computational decision-maker is good at explaining how it makes decisions, but not why. As
AI theorist Michael Wooldridge writes, one feature of the current wave of AI systems
is that they are black boxes: they cannot explain or rationalize the decisions they
make in the way that a person can.56 Embedded throughout free speech doctrine, as
well as the emerging commentary around Type II social media content moderation
and decision-making more generally,57 is a users right to explanationsocial media
54

The digital prior restraint problem is also spreading further down the Internet protocol
stack, from the application level to the Internet access level. See Mark Lemley, The Splinternet,
70 DUKE L.J. 1297, 131516 (2021), stating:
There are increasing moves by companies and internet service providers
(ISPs) to filter malicious sites at the domain-name system (DNS)
level so that they are never accessible at all, even on your server system.
Not that you just dont see them on your device. Your corporate server
never sees them either. The DNS routing system pretends that site on
the internet simply doesnt exist. If you try to send a message to it, you
will not get a response.
55
See, e.g., How Technology Detects Violations, FACEBOOK TRANSPARENCY CTR. (June 28,
2021), https://transparency.fb.com/enforcement/detecting-violations/technology-detects-viola
tions/ [https://perma.cc/5HPF-PECD] (We remove millions of violating posts and accounts
every day on the Facebook app and Instagram. Most of this happens automatically, with technology working behind the scenes to remove violating contentoften before anyone sees it.).
56
See WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 29, at 199 (emphasis in original).
57
See, e.g., Rory Van Loo, Federal Rules of Platform Procedure, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 829,
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platforms whose speech is banned or limited have a process-based right to understand
the basis on which the platform found their content to be infringing. To the extent AI
is used to effectuate those decisions, those explanations will be increasingly difficult
to provide.58
III. POSSIBLE REMEDIES FOR TYPE II PROBLEMS
A. Facebooks Oversight Board as Maker of Adjudicatory Policy in Type II
Decisions
The best way to mitigate against the problems inherent to Type II AI content
moderation is to develop a set of obligations for platforms using the system that
would remedy those problems, and to conceptualize where in the system they might
be placed. I refer here to information-forcing side constraints that would necessarily
cut some against the efficiency of AI, but would improve system procedure and
results for users in exchange for the efficiency loss.59 In the case of Facebook, the
platforms Oversight Board is already developing a role for itself in fashioning these
constraints.60 One of the Boards first cases involved Type II content moderation,
and the Board took an information-forcing approach to try and resolve broader Type
IIrelated challenges that the case raised.61
86768 (2020) [Section III.B.1] (arguing that platforms should exercise their adjudicatory
discretion in accordance with common law decision-making processes, which would give users
the ability to predict likely outcomes and argue their cases based on prior decisions).
58
See Shenkman et al., supra note 18, at 3334 (AI decision-making processes are complex and non-linear, and do not necessarily show their work, which makes it very difficult
to understand how they operate, what features they use to make decisions, and how various
decisions are weighted and why.) (citing Gabriel Eilertsen et al., Classifying the Classifier:
Dissecting the Weight Space of Neural Networks, ARXIV (2020)).
59
Thomas Nachbar has discussed side constraints, or a rule that ignores the goals of the
system on which it operates because it is in the service of some other goal, in the context of
algorithmic decision-making. Thomas Nachbar, Algorithmic Fairness, Algorithmic Discrimination, 48 FLA. ST. L. REV. 509, 525 (2021) (citing ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND
UTOPIA 2829 (1974)). For Nachbar, contested, open-ended concepts like fairness or transparency can only operate as side constraints to the primary goal of the computational process,
that is, the problem it is designed or optimized to solve. See id. at 527 (We can constrain the
operation of lending algorithms in certain ways to satisfy the demands of fairness (at least
the ones we can agree on) even if we cant program them to produce optimally fair outcomes
without converting them into fairness algorithms instead of lending algorithms.). I do not
disagree that concepts like notice and explainability are contested, but I use the concept of
side constraints to illustrate how serving those values might operate in both tandem and in
tension with automated content moderation processes.
60
Facebook Oversight Board Charter, art. 3 §§ 17, https://about.fb.com/wp-content/up
loads/2019/09/oversight_board_charter.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3VM-L3W2].
61
Case Decision 2020-004-IG-UA, OVERSIGHT BD. (Jan. 28, 2021), https://oversight
board.com/decision/IG-7THR3SI1/ [https://perma.cc/6PYE-KSSQ].
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The formation of Facebooks Oversight Board has been discussed in detail
elsewhere.62 For present purposes, the most important facet of its remit is that while
the Boards decisions with respect to individual moderation decisions are binding,
its recommendations with respect to policy, which are called Policy Advisory
Statements, are, as the name implies, not binding, though Facebook must respond
to its recommendations within a set period of time. 63 It is in this latter role that the
Board is attempting to develop information-forcing side constraints around AI
content moderation.
In October 2020, Facebooks automated AI image screening system took down
an image that included visible female nipples that was posted by a Brazilian user as
part of a breast cancer awareness campaign on Instagram.64 The system did so
because it deemed the post in violation of the platforms Community Standard on
Adult Nudity and Sexual Activity. The Board noted that the detection and removal
of this post was entirely automated.65 In the Policy Advisory Statement accompanying its opinion overruling the platforms decision, the Board stated that Facebook
should [i]nform users when automation is used to take enforcement action against
their content, including accessible descriptions of what this means66i.e., to tell
users whose content is removed by AI the why, not just the how. The Board
said the platform should also [i]mplement an internal audit procedure to continuously analyze a statistically representative sample of automated content removal
decisions to reverse and learn from enforcement mistakes, and [e]xpand transparency reporting to disclose data on the number of automated removal decisions per
Community Standard, and the proportion of those decisions subsequently reversed
following human review.67 In other words, and in response to the explainability
62

See, e.g., Kate Klonick, The Facebook Oversight Board: Creating an Independent
Institution to Adjudicate Online Free Expression, 129 YALE L.J. 2418 (2020).
63
See Facebook Oversight Board Charter, Introduction, art. 1, §§ 4, 6, art. 3, § 4, https://
about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/oversight_board_charter.pdf [https://perma.cc
/PRU4-X9KN] (Boards purpose is, inter alia, to issu[e] policy advisory opinions on Facebook
content policies and it will issue policy recommendations specific to a case decision or
upon Facebooks request, which will be taken into consideration by Facebook to guide its
future policy development.); Oversight Board Bylaws, 2.3.2, https://www.oversightboard
.com/sr/governance/bylaws [https://perma.cc/3M5N-Z2HG] (When the board chooses to
issue a policy advisory statement, . . . Facebook will provide a public response regarding [same]
and any follow-on action within thirty (30) days of the recommendation being received.).
64
Case Decision 2020-004-IG-UA, OVERSIGHT BD. (Jan. 28, 2021), https://oversight
board.com/decision/IG-7THR3SI1/ [https://perma.cc/9U4B-SXM8].
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. The audit recommendation probably does not do too much work, since what the
Board has done here, albeit likely unknowingly, is simply describe the process of machine
learning. Any internal audit data based on machine learning moderation decisions therefore
likely already exists. See supra Part II.
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issue discussed above, the Board is advising Facebook that it should give its users
what adjudications literature calls a right to a human decision, 68 what my fellow
Symposium contributor Margot Kaminski and other law-and-technology scholars
have called explainable AI,69 and what the European Union has begun to compel
of platforms through its General Data Protection Regulation.70 To repeat, Facebook
does not have to adopt the Boards policy recommendations, but it must consider
and respond to them; in its response to these recommendations concerning AI-based
content moderation, the platform committed to assessing the feasibility of more
transparency around automated content moderation and greater notice to users around
whether their content was removed or otherwise found to violate terms of service
by an algorithm rather than a human reviewer.71
The precise nature of the information-forcing side restraints that Facebook
chooses or is forced though regulation to develop and implement for AI-based
content moderation remains to be seen. What is notable about this colloquy between
Facebook and the Oversight Board for present purposes is its direction. It moves AI
content moderation further from, not toward, the ex ante Type II reality that Mark
Zuckerberg asked Congress to imagine in 2018.72 The need for human intervention
in algorithmic content moderation at several points in the decision-making model
seems more pressing, not less.
B. The Inevitable Role of Humans in Type II Decisions
Since some human role in speech regulation by algorithm seems inevitable, the
last question for this Article to raise is where the human intervention in a Type II
system might best go. Sensitivity to the scale problem likely leads at least part of the
way to Mark Zuckerbergs position: there must be automated moderation at the
68

See generally Aziz Z. Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, 106 VA. L. REV. 611 (2020).
While citing it for the general proposition articulated in its title, I should note that Aziz Huq
argues in this piece that the flaws inherent to algorithmic decision-making (or at least the
resolvable flaws) call more for a right to a better machine learning decision than a right to
require that humans decide. See id. at 68688.
69
See generally Margot E. Kaminski, The Right to Explanation, Explained, 34 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 189 (2019) (discussing the need for algorithmic accountability through explainable AI).
70
Council Regulation 2016/679 of Apr. 27, 2016, General Data Protection Regulation,
2016 O.J. (L 119) (algorithmic processing [by platforms or other data holders] should be
subject to suitable safeguards, which should include specific information to the data subject
and the right to obtain human intervention, to express his or her point of view, to obtain an
explanation of the decision reached after such assessment and to challenge the decision.).
71
Facebooks Response to the Oversight Boards First Decisions, https://about.fb.com
/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/OB_First-Decision_Detailed_.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3EE
-GYHE] (last visited Dec. 13, 2021).
72
See Zuckerberg Hearing, supra note 1 and accompanying text.

262

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:245

front-line decision of whether a given piece of content should go up or stay up. But
for a user to both understand why their content was taken down and to have a meaningful right to challenge that decision if they choose to, there needs to be human-level
explainability on the front line. Whether a human or AI does the explaining, the
reason for the decision must be capable of being understood by a user. This points
to the need for a resolution of the how vs. why problem discussed above. It also
calls for a side constraint that forces the system to provide the user with notice of the
automated action. Without a meaningful right to notice and an explanation at the
initial review level, the digital prior restraint problem is unsolvable.73
Nor does notice and a right to explanation solve the overinclusiveness problem
embedded in the process of machine learning. If a human sitting in review of an
automated content review decision concludes that the decision is wrong, their role
in overruling the systems decision has two next steps: (1) have the content put back
up, and (2) churn the false positive back into the system to prevent the same mistake
from happening, both with respect to the content in question and identical content
elsewhere on the platform. What they cannot do is prevent the mistake from happening in the first instance.
To be fair, human-based moderation systems are not perfect either, and mistakes
can and do occur under those systems as well. False positives are the inevitable byproduct of any content moderation system, indeed any speech regulation system
even First Amendment doctrinethat has the capacity to evolve. But the same scale
problem that calls for a prominent role for machine learning in content moderation
also multiplies the number of errors the system makes.
CONCLUSION
On May 19, 2021, an article titled Sharing Learnings About Our Image Cropping Algorithm was posted to Twitters Engineering Insights blog. 74 In the post,
Rumman Chowdhury, the head of Twitters Machine Learning, Ethics, and Algorithmic
Transparency team, shared the results of an internal study concerning Twitters
image cropping algorithm, in particular how the algorithm chose points-of-focus in
deciding how to crop pictures, and whether the algorithms cropping decisions were
biased depending on the gender and/or skin color of the people in the photos to be
73

Of course, [e]xplainability may mean different things in different contexts, and thus
different settings may require different types of explanations depending on the user or
other stakeholder to whom the explanation is owed. See Shenkman et al., supra note 18, at
34 (citing P. Jonathon Phillips et al., Four Principles of Explainable Artificial Intelligence,
NATL INST. FOR STANDARDS & TECH. (Aug. 2020)).
74
Rumman Chowdhury, Sharing Learnings About Our Image Cropping Algorithm,
TWITTER INSIGHTS BLOG (May 19, 2021), https://blog.twitter.com/engineering/en_us/topics
/insights/2021/sharing-learnings-about-our-image-cropping-algorithm.html [https://perma
.cc/PHN3-PJTK].
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cropped.75 The algorithm was trained to crop photographs based on its prediction as
to the part of a photo that a human might want to see first, so as to improve consistency and fast viewability of photos in Twitter user timelines.76 Reviewing randomly
linked images depicting individuals of different races and genders, the study found
that the algorithm cropped images in favor of white individuals over black individuals at a statistically significant rate.77 The rate at which the algorithm favored white
women over black women was even greater.78
In light of those results, the team imposed a side constraint on the algorithm. 79
Instead of automatic cropping of vertically oriented photographs, Twitters picture-posting function would provide users a preview of the cropped image before it was posted.80
The change, Chowdhury wrote, reduces [Twitters] dependency on [machine learning]
for a function that [it] agree[s] is best performed by people using our products.81
Twitters side constraint choicegreater user control over an otherwise fully
automated decisionis not a one-size-fits-all approach to resolving a Type II
moderation problem. Indeed, it may not even be a moderation problem that this
particular side constraint is attempting to solve. But it does show that platforms are
capable of making trade-offs between speed-and-scale-based solutions and resolving
the problems that the use of those solutions necessarily entail. If social media platforms are as dedicated to the values of transparency, free speech, and user agency as
they claim to be, then these trade-offs, and the human interventions in moderation
decision that effectuate them, will be both welcome and inevitable in the age of
speech-regulation-by-algorithm.

75

Twitter undertook the study in response to user claims of bias in the cropping algorithm, including critiques published on Twitter itself. See Kyra Yee et al., Image Cropping
on Twitter: Fairness Metrics, Their Limitations, and the Importance of Representation, Design,
and Agency, ARXIV (May 18, 2021), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2105.08667.pdf [https://perma.cc
/X4MD-U52R]; see also Anna Kramer, Twitters Image Cropping Was Biased, so it Dumped
the Algorithm, PROTOCOL (May 19, 2021), https://www.protocol.com/twitter-image-crop
ping-algorithm-biased [https://perma.cc/MYD6-A4AM].
76
See Yee et al., supra note 75, at 23. Twitter crops user pictures to make their dimensions
fit within the platforms standard aspect ratio. It also minimizes alternatives that degrade or
distort the original image, such as shrinking the entire photo to fit the platform aspect ratio.
See id. at 1.
77
See id. at 7.
78
Id. at 712.
79
Chowdhury, supra note 74.
80
Id.
81
Id.

